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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THELMA B. STANTON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

vs.

)

JAMES LAWRENCE STANTON,

)

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO. 14268

)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This was respondent's motion for judgment against
appellant for past due child support payments that accrued
after the parties' daughter attained the age of eighteen
years.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT
The trial court entered judgment against defendant for
the sum of $2,700.00, interest, and some costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the
trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 29, 1960, the parties were granted a decree
of divorce which required the father (appellant) to pay to
the mother (respondent) $100.00 per month support payments
for each of the parties' minor children.

The parties have
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two children, a daughter, Sherri, born February 12, 1953,
and a son, Rick, born January 29, 1955.

When Sherri became

eighteen years of age on February 12, 1971, the father
ceased making support payments on her behalf.
On May 22, 1973, the mother filed a motion for entry of
judgment against the father for $2,700.00 which represented
the support money for Sherri which had accumulated since her
eighteenth birthday.

The trial court denied the motion on

the ground that 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 set the age
of majority for females at eighteen years, and that the
decree's support obligation as to Sherri terminated on her
eighteenth birthday.

On appeal, this court held that the

statute was valid and sustained the lower court's ruling.
Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974).
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court was appealed to
the United States Supreme Court which, on April 15, 1975,
reversed the judgment and held that 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated
1953, as applied in this case, was unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d
688 (1975).

In its opinion the court stated:

With the age differential held invalid, it is
not for this court to determine when the appellee's
obligation for his children's support, pursuant to

- 2 -
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the divorce decree, terminates under Utah law. * * *
This plainly is an issue of state law to be resolved
by the Utah courts on remand; * * * . .
On May 13, 1975, a mandate was issued by the United States
Supreme Court, and the case was remanded to this court for
proceedings in conformity with the United States Supreme
Court 1 s decision.

In its order of remand the United States

Supreme Court awarded to the mother costs in the amount of
$437.38 (R.3,4).
On June 6, 197 5, plaintiff filed a motion with the Utah
Supreme Court to determine at what age support obligations
under a divorce decree end.

This court declined to rule on

the matter at that time, and remitted the case to the District
Court of Salt Lake County for further proceedings (R.2).
On September 10, 197 5, the Salt Lake County District Court
entered judgment in favor of the mother and against the father
for $2,7 00.00 in past due support money, $4 37.38 costs and
$508.80 interest (R.15).
ARGUMENT
I
THE LEGISLATURE HAS ENACTED A GENERAL POLICY THAT PARENTS
HAVE A DUTY TO SUPPORT THEIR CHILDREN UNTIL THEY REACH THE AGE
OF TWENTY-ONE YEARS.
The sole issue presented for review by this court is
whether support payments for the parties' daughter, Sherri,
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continued beyond the age of eighteen years.
There are presently two Utah statutes dealing directly
with when the duty of parents to support their children
terminates.

The first is 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953,

as amended, which provides:
15-2-1. Period of minority - The period of
minority extends in males and females to the age
of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their
majority by marriage. It is further provided that
courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21.
(Emphasis added)
This statute has no direct application to the case at bar
because it became effective after the present controversy
arose.

Its predecessor, which set the age of majority at

eighteen for women and twenty-one for men, is not controlling
because it was held invalid in the context of child support.
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d
688 (1975), reversing 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974).
However, the statute is pertinent because it manifests a policy
of the legislature to permit divorce courts to order parents
to support their children until the age of twenty-one.
The second and more definitive statute pertaining to
the duty of parents to support their children is the Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act (Title 78, Chapter 45, Utah
Code Annotated 1953) which has direct application to this
case.

The statute provides in part:
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78-45-2.

Definitions.
*

As used in this act:

* *

(4) "Child" means a son or daughter under
the age of 21 years and a son or daughter of
whatever age who is incapacitated from earning
a living and without sufficient means.
•

•

.

.

.

.

•

.

.

.

.

*

*

•

*

78-45-3. Duty of Man. Every man shall
support his wife and his child.
78-45-4. Duty of Woman. Every woman shall
support her child; and she shall support her husband when he is in need.
Appellant in his brief cites at great length Utah
statutes defining the age at which persons are permitted to
engage in certain activities, i.e., enter into contracts,
make wills, use firearms, drive automobiles, marry, commit
crimes, open bank accounts, etc.

The relevancy of these

statutes is highly questionable inasmuch as Utah has three
statutes defining "children" for the purpose of support, and
all three indicate the support obligation does not cease
until the twenty-first birthday.

In addition to the Uniform

Civil Liability for Support Act, the Public Assistance Act
of 1961 (Title 55, Chapter 15a, Utah Code Annotated 1953)
and the recently enacted Public Support of Children Act
(Title 78, Chapter 45b, Utah Code Annotated 1953) terminate
the support of children at twenty-one years of age.
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The Public Assistance Act of 1961 provides in part:
55-15a-17. Assistance shall be provided
under this act for individuals who qualify as
follows:
(1)

Persons in need, that

(a) are children under the age of 21 and
who have been deprived of natural parent or
step-parent support or care * * *
The Public Support of Children Act provides in part:
78~45b-2.

As used in this chapter:
* * *

(2) "Dependent child" means any person
under the age of twenty-one who is not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or
a member of the armed forces of the United States.
.

•

/

•

*

*

*

II . • .
A UTAH COURT IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING HAS AUTHORITY TO
ORDER SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN UNTIL THE PARENTS LEGAL DUTY TO
SUPPORT THEIR CHILDREN TERMINATES AT THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE.
Our Divorce statute, 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953,
at the time this proceeding was commenced, provided:
When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation to the
children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be
equitable. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new •
orders with respect to the support and maintenance
of the parties, the custody of the children and
their support and maintenance, or the distribution
of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary.

- 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Dehm v, Dehmy decided January 14, 197 6, this court
clarified the above statute in terms of when the court's jurisdiction to order child support ceases.

In Dehm the trial

court continued the father's obligation of child support
indefinitely based on the specialized needs of the parties1
retarded children.

The father appealed on the basis that

the term "children" as used in 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated
1953 refers only to minor children.

The court adapted the

standards established in the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act for authorizing child support for children in a
divorce proceeding.

The court stated:

Since the term "children" has been neither
limited nor defined by the legislature in Section
30-3-5, a court in a divorce proceeding has the
authority to order support for "children" so long
as there is a legal duty on the part of the parents
to so provide.
In Chapter 45, Title 78, the legislature has
set forth with specificity the duty of every man
(78-45-3) and the duty of every woman (78-45-4) to
support their children. Section 78-45-2(4), U.C.A.
1953, as amended 1957, defines "child" as a
son or daughter under the age of 21 years or
a son or daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means.
The Dehm decision clearly indicates that a court in a divorce
proceeding should order parents to support their children
until they attain age twenty-one in accordance with the legislative policy of the state.
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Ill
INVALIDATION OF 15-2-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
REINSTATED THE COMMON LAW AGE OF MAJORITY.
At common law, the age of majority was twenty-one years
for both males and females. Ann., "Age at which females
attain majority,lf 95 A.L.R. 355; 42 Am.Jur.2d, Infants, §3.
When 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 was enacted it abrogated
the common law by lowering the age of majority for females
to eighteen years. When the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the classifications established in 15-2-1 Utah
Code Annotated as discriminatory and a denial of equal protection in the context of child support, the common law age
of majority was reinstated.

In 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, §384

this principle is stated:
It is a general principle that the repeal of
a statute which abrogates the common law operates to reinstate the common-law rule, unless
it appears the legislature did not intend such
reinstatement.
While the instant case technically does not involve a
repeal but an invalidation of a statute, the basic principle
remains the same. Furthermore, 68-3-1 Utah Code Annotated
expressly provides that Utah adopt the common law as a rule
of decision for the courts in this state, unless contrary to
the Constitution or laws of the United States or Utah:
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The common law of England so far as it is
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Constitution or laws of the United States,, or the
Constitution or laws of this state, and so far
only as it is consistent with and adapted to
the natural and physical conditions of this
state and the necessities of the people hereof,
is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
IV
15-2-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO
BENEFIT THE EXCLUDED CLASS.
When the United States Supreme Court held the statutory
classification of 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 unconstitutional this did not require a denial of the benefit to both
classes.

The benefit of the statute should be extended to

the excluded class.

See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88

S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968); Moritz v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972); Harrigfeld
v. District Court, 95 Idaho 540, 511 P.2d 822 (1973).
Appellant seems to agree that benefits previously denied
should be extended to the excluded class, but seeks to transform the case into one dealing generally with the "benefits
of emancipation".

This case involves only child support.

In the context of child support, construing the statute to
benefit the excluded class requires continuing the support
obligation of females until the age of twenty-one.
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It should

be noted, however, that although the statute should permit
the support obligations to continue until age twenty-one,
they do not necessarily continue until such time.

As with

males under the prior statute, when the child marries,
leaves home, or otherwise becomes emancipated prior to the
twenty-first birthday, the support obligation terminates.
Even if it were determined (which it has not been) that
at the time of the divorce the parties reasonably expected
the support obligation for Sherri to terminate at age eighteen,
the parties1 prior expectations are not sufficient justification
to construe the statute to deny Sherri support payments from
her father.

In the leading case of Rosher v. Superior Court,

9 Cal.2d 556, 71 P.2d 918 (1937) the California Supreme
Court held that a statute raising the age of majority of
females from eighteen to twenty-one could be properly applied
to extend the child support obligation of a father under a
decree of divorce entered prior to the effective date of
such legislation.

The court stated:

[I]t cannot be said that any vested right
with regard to his duty to support or care for
his minor children is acquired by a divorced
parent as a result of the divorce decree or
custody orders made in connection therewith.
Hence no such right is impaired by holding
that the entry of a divorce decree or the making of a custody or support order does not °P~
erate to limit the petitioner's liability to
his minor child to the period of minority fixed
by the statute at the time of the entry of the
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decree, his obligation would continue throughtout
the extended period of minority. The divorce decree and support order neither separately nor in
conjunction constitute a permanent and final adjudication of the extent of his obligation to
support his minor child.
For similar cases see State v. Kiessenbeck, 167 Ore.25, 114
P.2d 147 (1941); Irby v. Martin, 500 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1972).
And in two cases cited by appellant, the expectations of
the parties was not considered to be of importance.

Phelps

v. Phelps, 85 N.M.62, 509 P.2d 254 (1973), and Jungjohann
v. Jungjohann, 516 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1973).
CONCLUSION
The paramount concern of this court is not with the
mother or father but with the child whose nurture and education are of significant state interest.

As an expression

of this interest the legislature has provided in the Uniform
Civil Liability for Support Act, the Public Assistance Act
of 1961 and the Public Support of Children Act, that the
obligation of parents, and society in general, is to support
children, male and female, until they reach twenty-one years
of age. With this same interest in mind the provisions of
15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 were amended to authorize
divorce courts to order support to age twenty-one while at
the same time providing that persons attain majority at age
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eighteen.

The support and maintenance obligations of

divorce decrees must be coextensive with the general parental obligation and this court has so held in the case
of Dehm v. Dehm.
With the invalidation of 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated
1953, the support obligation extends to the age of twentyone years under common law principles and 78-45-3 Utah Code
Annotated 1953.

The trial court properly ruled the support

obligation continued to age twenty-one, and that decision
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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